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This paper gives an empirical view of the ex-post equity risk premium in a number of international 
markets with special attention to emerging ones. Our study yields interesting implications for 
finance. Firstly, we find that the equity risk premium in emerging markets is significantly higher 
than in developed markets. Secondly, the extent to which emerging stock markets reward investors 
is varying through time. We cannot link this time varying nature with the presence of a structural 




(also downloadable) in electronic version: http://som.rug.nl/ 
                                                 
* Salomons is at University of Groningen and AEGON Asset Management, The Netherlands. 
Grootveld is at Robeco Group, The Netherlands. Correspondence: r.m.salomons@eco.rug.nl 
   1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Investing in equities hopefully provides investors a return that exceeds the risk free rate 
of return. The difference between the two is also known as the equity risk premium, or 
ERP. T he average long-term ERP exceeds the level that classical equilibrium theory 
predicts. Mehra and Prescott [1985] showed that for the US in the period 1889-1978 the 
ERP has been in excess of 6% per annum. In a consumer CAPM framework this 
corresponds with a level of relative risk aversion of 26. This is far higher than 
experimental theory predicts; values between 1 and 10 can be seen as normal within this 
framework. Being incapable of associating the measured risk with  the observed return, 
Mehra and Prescott dubbed the phenomenon the equity premium puzzle. Ever since, the 
issue caught the attention of academics as well as practitioners and spawned a whole new 
literature  based on two classes of explanations for the existence of the ERP puzzle: 
theoretical and empirical. This paper is a contribution to the empirical research. 
1  
From the  empirical side Siegel [1992] extends the Mehra-Prescott sample to 
1802-1990 and observes an ERP of 5.3% per annum over the entire period. Moreover, 
early stock returns did not exceed the risk free rate of return by nearly the same 
magnitude as they did in recent data.  Brown, Goetzmann and Ross [1995] and 
Goetzmann and Jorion [1999] suggest the high equity premium in US equities to be the 
exception rather than the rule. They hint at the issue of survivorship bias by only 
observing the US, a clear survivor in a turbulent century. Blanchard [1993], Fase [1997] 
and Dimson, Marsh and Staunton [2001] show the robustness of the puzzle by studying a 
number of developed countries. Fase finds the theory to be even more at odds with reality 
for Belgium, France, Germany, The Netherlands, and the UK in the post-war period 
compared to those in the US. This, however, still does not completely resolve the issue of 
survivorship bias.  
                                                 
1 For an excellent discussion of the theoretical literature we refer to Kocherlakota [1996].   2 
Empirical finance has mostly focussed on advanced markets and exchanges. We 
aim to extend the analysis to include emerging markets. Among others, Bernartzi and 
Thaler [1995] and Campbell and Cochrane [1999] claim that the high equity risk 
premium in the US was necessary to entice people into the market. Where does this leave 
us for emerging markets? As emerging markets are perceived to be more risky, one 
would expect a higher incentive. Barry, Peavy and Rodriguez [1997] and Claessens, 
Dasgupta and Glen [1995] have shown that investing in emerging markets is beneficial in 
a risk/return framework. These papers and numerous others claim that investors are 
compensated for bearing the risks in terms of higher average returns and a low correlation 
with developed markets and among other emerging markets. We leave aside the issue of 
diversification to focus specifically on return and test whether the perceived risk is 
reflected in larger ERP for emerging markets. In this paper we provide differences and 
similarities of the ex-post ERP for emerging markets compared to developed markets and 
show that the ERP is significantly higher in emerging markets. 
Moreover, we examine the time varying nature of the ERP in emerging markets 
and attempt to explain the differences in ERP we observe by building on economic 
literature. If emerging markets become more developed one would expect a structural 
change in the equity risk premium. It is hard to present evidence for a change in level, 
also by studying the cross-section of emerging markets ERP. As equity markets in 
emerging countries are perceived to be of higher risk, one might also expect that the 
changes in global business cycle have some form of explanatory power over their risk 
premium. We show that the time variation in ERP for the emerging market asset class 
tend to be of a cyclical nature.  
In the next section, we start by giving a description of the data. Section 3 contains 
our main testing results and examines the economic case for observed differences. 
Section 4 concludes. 
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2. DESCRIPTION OF DATA 
With regards to data and interpretation of the data, we encountered some standard 
emerging market problems. Firstly, p erformance results for emerging markets are 
unfortunately not available for such extended periods as for large developed countries. 
Moreover, the data tends to be rather volatile. Consequently, we do not have the luxury of 
drawing conclusions from long term empirically validated relations. Secondly, the quality 
and availability of the data  is sometimes wanting. Thirdly, regime shifts during the 
sample period might complicate the interpretation of empirical results over the entire 
sample period. Currencies used to be fixed, but flexible exchange rate systems are now 
common in many emerging economies. These factors prevent us from drawing very 
strong conclusions. 
We use Morgan Stanley Capital International, MSCI, indices for developed 
equity markets and rely on International Financial Corporation, IFC, indices for emerging 
markets. All returns are monthly total returns denominated in US dollars. Data on risk-
free rate of return are from the International Financial Statistics, IFS, database at the 
International Monetary Fund. We rely on the US monthly money market rate. Data on 
industrial production and leading indicators is from the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, OECD. The emerging market countries listed in Table 1 
are selected because they represent markets at which investors tend to focus. Besides that, 
they don’t have large barriers obstructing investing and most of them have a sufficiently 
long history to make empirical results statistically valid. For the developed markets we 
evaluated the MSCI World, and furthermore, restricted our attention to the most 
developed, G7, countries. 
The IFS data are available from January 1976 until December 2001. Equity 
market data for all developed markets start in January 1976. Not all emerging markets 
have data from January 1976 onwards. As time progresses gradually more countries are 
added to the database.    4 
Table 1: Index constituents 
Developed Index  Emerging Index       
G7  Asia  Latin America  Africa/Middle East  Eastern Europe 
Canada  China  Argentina  Egypt  Czech Republic 
France   India  Brazil  Israel  Hungary 
Germany  Indonesia  Chile  South Africa  Poland 
Italy  Korea  Colombia    Russia 
Japan  Malaysia  Mexico    Turkey 
United Kingdom  Pakistan  Peru     
United States  Phlippines  Venezuela     
  Taiwan       
  Thailand       
 




t t R R ERP - =                     (1) 
Measured in local currencies would be the purest form of the equity risk premium, but 
this would be less interesting from the perspective of an international investor.  We 
evaluate US$ returns in developed and emerging markets versus US$ risk-free rates of 
return. When portfolios are rebalanced, investors need to do currency transactions. So 
instead of being dependable on one variable, the market return, they depend on an extra 
stochastic variable, the currency. The impact of currency fluctuation is best illustrated by 
a Latin America example. In the period 1985-1990 Argentinean equities registered a 
521% gain in US$ term, in spite of suffering a huge currency depreciation against the 
dollar. In the 1990-1995 period equities in Brazil registered a local currency gain of 
12,854,287% while it gained “only” 204% in US$ terms. The distributional 
characteristics of the time series are in Tables 2-5. The higher returns and more volatile 
nature of emerging markets returns are evident.  
 
•  For the MSCI World we observe an annualised ERP of 1.8% over the period 
February 1988 – December 2001. For the US we find an ERP of 3.7% over the entire 
sample period, somewhat lower than the numbers documented in the literature. For   5 
the same sample period, France and the UK carry higher numbers, which is consistent 
with the observation by Fase [1999]. The ERP in Germany is slightly lower than in 
the US. The differences between our numbers and the ones documented by Dimson, 
Marsh and Staunton [2001] are most likely due to calculation in US$ terms and 
different data sources. We have included the most recent years in our data, years in 
which investors were not that much rewarded. Although the numbers differ in terms 
of magnitude, results are nonetheless very similar in direction and ordering. On an 
equal weighted basis, the annualised ERP of the G7 countries was 3.6% over the 
entire sample. 
•  The market capitalisation weighted IFC index for emerging markets has an 
annualised ERP of 3.1% for the period January 1985  – December 2001. Cross-
sectional variation of ERP is large for emerging markets, which indicates that some 
markets have offered a better compensation for risk than others. In some markets, 
most notably Egypt, Indonesia and Pakistan, the ERP is even negative over the 
sample period. On an equal weighted basis, the annualised ERP of the emerging 
markets was 12.7% for the entire sample.  
 
A reasonable assumption is that investors exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion; hence 
they tend to have a preference for positive skewness. 
2 The negative skew and higher 
(excess) kurtosis in developed markets is also observed by Bekaert, Erb, Harvey and 
Viskanta [1998]. Clearly the ERP data for all observed markets are not normally 
distributed. Following Jarque and Bera [1980] we have tested for non-normality and the 
test results confirm the observation that equity premia are non-normally distributed. 
3  
This is true for all individual G7 and emerging markets.  
                                                 
2 See Kraus and Litzenberger [1976]. 
3 Test statistics are not reported in the table, but available on request.    6 
Time series analysis of return series in emerging markets highlights the presence 
of substantial autocorrelation. The literature points toward predictability of emerging 
market returns (e.g. Harvey [1995] and Bekaert, Erb, Harvey and Viskanta [1997]). The 
Ljung and Box [1978] statistic is used to test for several orders of autocorrelation in the 
ERP series. We find a alternating sequence of autocorrelation in the IFC index: positive 
first order autocorrelation, negative autocorrelation at lags above one year and positive 
again at lags near three years. No significant positive or negative correlation can be 
detected for the MSCI index. The equally weighted indices, which cover a substantially 
longer time period, display similar behaviour and the same holds for the set of individual 
countries within developed and emerging markets. The ERP is emerging market is more 
predictable and has the tendency to mean revert in the data examined. 
4  
                                                 
4 This mean reversion is at much shorter lags than indicated in work by DeBondt and Thaler 
[1985].   7 
Table 2: Distributional characteristics of the monthly ERP of Developed Markets, denominated in US$. Table shows sample period, number of 
observations, mean, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, median and corresponding z-value, minimum and maximum.  
  Canada  France  Germany  Italy  Japan  UK   US  MSCI  G7 (equal) 
  1/76 - 12/01  1/76 - 12/01  1/76 - 12/01  1/76 - 12/01  1/76 - 12/01  1/76 - 12/01  1/76 - 12/01  2/88 – 12/01  1/76 - 12/01 
No.  312  312  312  312  312  312  312  167  312 
Mean  0.14%  0.40%  0.28%  0.32%  0.32%  0.36%  0.30%  0.15%  0.30% 
St. dev  5.73%  6.59%  6.01%  7.64%  6.69%  5.78%  4.36%  4.18%  4.38% 
Skewness  -0.53  -0.14  -0.24  0.35  0.33  -0.02  -0.49  -0.41  -0.53 
Kurtosis 
5  2.15  1.30  1.04  0.71  0.61  1.35  2.12  0.59  1.32 
Median  0.33%  0.62%  0.39%  0.02%  0.01%  0.29%  0.52%  0.63%  0.40% 
Min  -23.64%  -25.21%  -18.47%  -21.96%  -20.09%  -22.32%  -22.05%  -14.60%  -17.96% 
Max  16.70%  25.31%  19.37%  30.18%  23.53%  21.65%  12.46%  10.37%  11.62% 
 
                                                 
5 Kurtosis statistics detailed are excess kurtosis, i.e. the extent to which distributions have fatter tails than normally distributed variables (in 
which case it is 3).    8 
Table 3: Distributional characteristics of the monthly ERP of Emerging Markets, denominated in US$. Table shows sample period, number of 
observations, mean, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, median and corresponding z-value, minimum and maximum.  
  Argentina  Chile  Colombina  Peru  Venezuela  Brazil  Mexico  Latam  IFC  GEM 
  1/76 – 12/01  1/76 - 12/01  1/85 - 12/01  10/93 - 12/01  1/85 - 12/01  1/76 - 12/01  1/76 - 12/01  1/76 - 12/01  1/85 - 12/01  1/76 - 12/01 
No.  312  312  204  99  204  312  312  312  204  312 
Mean  3.16%  1.19%  0.75%  0.18%  0.91%  0.73%  0.99%  0.07%  0.25%  1.04% 
St. dev  25.13%  10.23%  8.96%  8.48%  13.49%  15.73%  12.15%  10.42%  6.74%  6.32% 
Skewness  2.36  0.91  1.16  0.43  0.00  0.49  -0.82  0.38  -0.56  -0.05 
Kurtosis  11.39  3.82  3.19  3.14  2.44  1.47  3.44  3.01  1.66  1.38 
Median  0.30%  -0.07%  -0.43%  -0.45%  0.01%  -1.03%  1.38%  -0.53%  0.68%  0.98% 
Min  -65.69%  -28.94%  -20.85%  -29.07%  -50.75%  -57.72%  -59.92%  -34.41%  -26.01%  -28.32% 
Max  177.10%  61.32%  36.79%  31.66%  46.87%  56.34%  38.96%  46.47%  18.91%  20.64% 
   9 
Table 4: Distributional characteristics of the monthly ERP of Emerging Markets, denominated in US$. Table shows sample period, number of 
observations, mean, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, median and corresponding z-value, minimum and maximum.  
  Czech 
Republic 
Hungary  Poland  Russia  Turkey  Egypt  Israel  South Africa  EMEA 
6  GEM 
  1/94 - 12/01  2/97 - 12/01  1/94 - 12/01  2/97 - 12/01  1/87 - 12/01  2/97 - 12/01  2/97 - 12/01  1/94 - 12/01  2/98 - 12/01  1/76 - 12/01 
No.  96  59  96  59  180  59  59  95  47  312 
Mean  0.46%  2.00%  -0.13%  2.00%  2.15%  -2.54%  0.39%  -0.35%  -0.50%  1.04% 
St. dev  11.83%  21.62%  13.22%  21.62%  20.11%  7.09%  7.56%  8.32%  7.62%  6.32% 
Skewness  0.56  -0.20  0.22  -0.20  0.85  1.03  -0.64  -0.63  -1.15  -0.05 
Kurtosis  2.99  1.35  1.33  1.35  1.18  1.07  0.06  2.38  3.01  1.38 
Median  0.38%  3.64%  0.14%  3.64%  -1.34%  -3.25%  1.33%  -0.17%  0.90%  0.98% 
Min  -38.65%  -62.95%  -38.07%  -6 2.95%  -41.11%  -13.15%  -19.59%  -33.52%  -28.75%  -28.32% 
Max  43.83%  57.99%  38.36%  57.99%  70.86%  18.59%  14.07%  21.10%  14.96%  20.64% 
 
                                                 
6 EMEA is abbreviation for Eastern Europe, Middle East and Africa.   10
Table 5: Distributional characteristics of the monthly ERP of Emerging Markets, denominated in US$. Table shows sample period, number of 
observations, mean, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, median and corresponding z-value, minimum and maximum.  
  China  India  Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Pakistan  Philippines  Taiwan  Thailand  Asia  GEM 
  11/93 - 12/01  1/76 - 12/01  1/90 - 12/01  1/76 - 12/01  6/95 - 12/01  6/95 - 12/01  1/85 - 12/01  1/85 - 12/01  1/85 - 12/01  1/85 - 12/01  1/76 - 12/01 
No.  98  312  144  312  78  78  204  204  204  204  312 
Mean  0.67%  0.34%  -0.68%  0.51%  -0.92%  -0.92%  -0.14%  1.09%  1.28%  0.18%  1.04% 
St. dev  13.87%  8.11%  14.38%  11.24%  13.15%  13.15%  9.52%  11.11%  13.32%  7.46%  6.32% 
Skewness  3.93  0.53  0.46  1.17  1.15  1.15  0.70  0.71  0.63  -0.14  -0.05 
Kurtosis  25.96  1.33  2.23  4.97  4.17  4.17  3.78  2.59  1.87  1.00  1.38 
Median  -0.43%  0.02%  -1.44%  -0.80%  -1.02%  -1.02%  -0.81%  0.44%  0.15%  0.27%  0.98% 
Min  -20.93%  -24.71%  -40.57%  -34.01%  -31.80%  -31.80%  -35.65%  -30.06%  -36.11%  -25.96%  -28.32% 
Max  99.28%  34.90%  54.35%  68.02%  53.14%  53.14%  35.45%  46.50%  52.76%  24.05%  20.64%   11
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The starting point to compare the equity risk premium in emerging markets with 
developed markets is to evaluate the indices. We construct equally weighted indices for 
both developed (G7) and emerging (GEM) markets. This makes it possible to have longer 
history available and reduces the impact of country specific issues. An equal weighting 
scheme has the advantage that the index is not skewed to large markets, which in the 
extreme, would boil down to comparing the US with the largest emerging markets. Hence 
the impact of survivorship bias, as suggested by Brown, Goetzmann and Ross [1995] and 
Goetzmann and Jorion [1999], is somewhat limited. Distributional characteristics are 
shown in Tables 2 -5. Both ERP series for emerging and developed indices are non-
normally distributed. Figure 2 presents the distribution of ERP indices in US$ returns and 
clearly shows higher volatility, difference in skewness and fatter tails for the emerging 
market equity risk premium. 
Besides the issue of diversification, conventional wisdom is that emerging 
markets compensate investors for the inherent risks in terms of high average returns. But 
is this really the case in practice? To answer this question we have split up this section 
into two subsections that will each cover a different subject. First, we will investigate the 
statistical difference between the ERP in emerging and developed markets on a one-
month horizon. Second, we study the time varying behaviour of ERP data to test for the 
presence of cycles or breaks in the data. We will touch on differences between markets in 
our sample and show that some markets have been rewarding investors for the perceived 
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Figure 1: Distributions for monthly equity risk premia developed and emerging markets in US$ for 
Jan 1976 - December 2001. Both graphs have similar scale and are based on an equal weighted index of 
developed and emerging markets respectively. 










































3.1 Short-term equity risk premium  
Having constructed the indices and observed the data we can test for differences and 
similarities in the equity risk premium of emerging compared to developed markets. On 
the basis of our equally weighted indices we accept the hypothesis of a larger ERP for 
emerging markets compared to developed markets at a 5% significance level. Table 6 
gives the corresponding statistics. Calculating a Sharpe ratio, i.e. adjusting the ERP for 
standard deviation, also shows higher Sharpe ratios for emerging markets.  
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Table 6: Statistics for differences in ERP between developed and emerging markets. Table gives the 
mean and median values of both developed and emerging indices denominated in US$ ERP. The final 
column gives statistics for differences between emerging and developed ERP. It also shows the Sharpe and 
Sortino ratios for the equal weighted indices. 
7 The sample period is 1976-2001.  
Equal Weighted Returns  Developed index  Emerging Index  Test for difference 
Mean  0.30%  1.04%  t = 1.7 
Sharpe   0.24  0.57   
Median  0.40%  0.98%  z = 1.8  
Sortino  0.42  0.87   
 
Because of the nature of the data it is not sufficient to test only for difference in 
mean values. As the distributions are far from normal we test for differences in median as 
well. Based on Wilcoxon tests on differences in median values, median values are 
statistically significantly higher in emerging markets.  
Within finance, investment risk is commonly defined by standard deviation, 
which has one major drawback. Standard deviations measure uncertainty or variability of 
returns but in some cases this does not match one’s intuition about risk. Large positive 
outcomes are treated as equally risky as large negative ones. In practice, however, 
positive outliers should be regarded as a bonus and not as a risk. It is therefore better to 
look at some measure of downside risk. 
8 We calculate downside standard deviation, semi 
deviation for short, for both indices and show Sortino ratios in Table 3. Emerging markets 
contain more downside risk, measured by semi deviation, in comparison to developed 
markets. The change in risk is not enough to alter the conclusion that investors are 
rewarded with higher ERP. However, we note that in the cross-section of markets using 
                                                 
7 We calculate Sharpe and Sortino ratio by annualising the mean and standard deviation, 
respectively semi deviation. 
8 Downside risk measures were introduced by the “Safety First” criterion from Roy [1952]. Bawa 
[1975] and Fishburn [1977] introduced downside risk in the expected utility framework. A 
practical implication of downside variance for asset management is provided in Sortino and Van 
der Meer [1991]. See Grootveld and Hallerbach [1999] for an overview of downside risk measures 
with their theoretical and practical properties.   14
semi deviation or standard deviation makes for substantial differences in risk. In 
Argentina, the annualised semi deviation is 87.0% versus standard deviation of 70.7%. As 
a stark contrast we highlight the US where semi deviation of 8.8% is combined with a 
standard deviation of 15.1%. Investment decisions based on Sharpe and Sortino ratios 
would be different. 
9 
Another risk measure that differences between the upside potential and downside 
risk is the shortfall probability. It regards the probability of defeat by a benchmark at the 
end of the investment horizon. In shortfall terminology, we are interested in the 
probability that the ERP of emerging markets is lower than developed markets. Shortfall 
probabilities are 49%.  Based on a Wilcoxon test, there is no statistically significant 
difference between emerging markets and developed markets ERP. So the probabilities of 
a lower ERP in emerging markets do not differ substantially from developed market at 
short horizons. The point is that this tells us the probability of a disastrous event, but in 
itself does not tell us the damage it causes. 
10  
  Using downside risk measure is revealing as it lays bare  the “true” risk of 
investing in emerging markets. In general investors are rewarded with higher return, but 
if things go wrong, the damage can be severe and detrimental to performance. 
11 The next 
section, which will study the time varying nature of emerging ERP, highlights this issue.  
 
                                                 
9 In general and in line with the distributional characteristics, we observe that the difference 
between semi deviation and standard deviation are more pronounced in developed markets. 
10 This observation becomes even more relevant as longer investment horizons. As investors in 
emerging markets in practice do not invest for just one month, we studied longer horizon ERP. At 
longer horizon the shortfall probabilities decrease more rapidly in emerging markets than they do 
in developed markets.   
11 Precisely this observation has led Estrada [2000] to advocate using downside risk for emerging 
markets.   15
3.2 Time-varying nature of ERP 
We have learned from Bekaert, Erb, Harvey and Viskanta [1998] that the structure of the 
return distribution of emerging markets is potentially unstable. Distributional 
characteristics of ERP in Table 2-5 confirm this observation. It is clear that ERP tends to 
be less stable through time in emerging markets as Figure 2 shows. As shown, in general 
the environment for emerging market investing has been rather rewarding with one 
period, 1985-1994, clearly standing out. One is able to observe the correlation between 
the ERP in emerging markets and the difference between ERP in emerging markets 
compared to developed market, the excess ERP.  
Figure 2: Emerging market ERP. The line in the graph shows the emerging market ERP after applying a 
twelve-month moving average filter. The bars are the differences between the ERP in emerging markets 










































Excess GEM ERP  16
The detrimental effects of major emerging market crisis can be spotted quite 
easily and serves to show the extent to which downside risk is revealing. The first period 
in which emerging markets were delivering substantial negative ERP was in the 
beginning of the 1980s. This period was marked by the Latin America debt crisis erupting 
in 1982. The reliance on cheap, mainly short term, foreign capital to finance current 
account deficits came to the fore when investors became to realise that Mexico would not 
be able to payback its loans. 
12 The second crisis period began in 1995 with Mexico 
(widely known as the Mexican Tequila crisis) and continued in Asia in 1997-1998. 
Especially the latter period resulted in severely negative ERP in our sample period. A 
round of depreciation that started in Thailand in July 1997, culminated almost one year 
later in the default of Russia. In retrospect, the crises of the 1990s were due primarily to a 
combination of unsustainable current account deficits, excessive short-term foreign debt 
and weak domestic banking systems. Over enthusiasm prior to 1994 had made emerging 
markets vulnerable and the crisis exposed the macroeconomic imbalances. The firm 
belief in economic miracles ended abruptly. 
13 
We aim to find economic explanations for the time-varying nature of the ERP by 
distinguishing structural and cyclical changes.  
•  The literature emphasizing structural elements suggests that changes in economic 
structure and  increased reliance on a market-style economy leads economies to be 
more integrated in the global economy. Bekaert [1995], Stulz [1999] and Henry 
[2000] claim that as markets get more liberalised and integrated, the cost of capital 
decreases because the removal of investment barriers allows for risk sharing. 
Rational investors should consider that the integration process might lower the 
                                                 
12 See Pastor [1987]. 
13 Feldstein [2002] gives an excellent assessment of emerging market crises and shows that the 
crisis of the 1980s is a “standard” balance of payment crisis whereas the crisis of the 1990s is a 
combination of balance of payment and financial crisis. The interaction of the two made the effects 
so devastating (Krueger [2002]).   17
required risk premium (lower expected returns) and increase correlation between 
emerging markets and developed markets. Bekaert [1995] details that many of the 
capital market liberalisations, that investors tend to welcome, occurred in early 
1990s. Henry [2000] lists all dates and type of market liberalisation by country. The 
hypothesis we test is that liberalisations and reforms cause markets to become less 
emerging (more developed) and result in lower level of ERP. 
•  The cyclical explanation is based on the view that the global business cycle is the 
main force behind the time varying nature of the ERP in emerging markets. This 
approach is related to the fact that emerging economies are heavily exposed with the 
global business cycles and that investors might see emerging markets as a “leveraged 
play” on the global cycle, i.e. high beta markets. The first part of this view finds 
support in publications by the International Monetary Fund [2001] and Frankel and 
Roubini [2002]. The most visible channel of transmission is trade. Export revenue is 
key to the ability of emerging markets to service debt. Demand for the types of 
goods that emerging countries produces tends to be procyclical. Frankel and Roubini 
[2002] estimate in a simple regression (for the period 1977-1999) that every one 
percentage point increase in G7 growth raises the growth rate in emerging markets 
by 0.78 percentage points. Recent literature focuses on the key factors that might 
explain the extent of output co-movement between advanced and developing 
economies. 
14 The hypothesis we are interested in is whether cyclical patterns in ERP 
correlate with global business cycle. 
 
Structural aspect on emerging market ERP 
As the test for a change in level of ERP due to structural changes we follow the Bekaert  
[1995] suggestion and split the data into two sub-samples with same number of data 
                                                 
14 See IMF [2001] for references on literature that focuses on the three main transmission channels 
for macroeconomic fluctuations: 1) trade, 2) finance and 3) direct sectoral linkages.    18
points: 1978-1989 and 1990-2001. 
15 We tested for differences between m arkets and 
between sample periods and displayed statistics in Table 9. The ERP in emerging markets 
is not significantly lower in the former period (1978-1989). Contrary to Bekaert, Erb, 
Harvey and Viskanta [1998], who observe a drop in the degree of volatility of equities in 
1990s versus the 1980s, we find similar levels of volatility. Lower volatility in Latin 
America is outweighed by much higher volatility of Asian equity markets. No difference 
can be observed for developed markets between the two sample periods either. Nor is 
there a significant difference between ERP in emerging and developed markets. Although 
there might be problems with the nature of the data, this points to no impact of structural 
changes on the level of ERP.  
Table 7: Sub samples of equity risk premium for Jan 1978 - Dec 2001. Table gives the mean values of 
both developed and emerging indices denominated in US$ ERP. The final column gives statistics for 
differences between emerging and developed ERP. Differences between sample periods are in final row.  
Local Returns  Developed index  Emerging Index  Test for difference 
Mean (1978-89)  0.65%  1.14%  t = 0.80  
Mean (1990-01)  0.06%  0.54%  t = 0.76 
Test for difference  t = 1.14  t = 0.83    
 
To be more conclusive we study higher moments of the distribution. Following 
Bekaert, Erb, Harvey and Viskanta [1998] we explore the time series pattern of emerging 
markets skewness and kurtosis more carefully and compare those with developed 
markets. The transformation of emerging markets from a state of segmentation to a state 
of integration arguably changes the fundamental sources of risk and affects skewness and 
kurtosis. Liberalisations might be followed by discrete price hikes, inducing (temporarily) 
positive skewness and kurtosis. Following successful integration these should gradually 
                                                 
15 We omit data from 1976 and 1977, years in which emerging market were rewarding, in order for 
the sample periods to be similar size. Including these observations and adjusting for different size 
of samples does not alter the results.   19
decrease. Figure 3 shows the behaviour of skewness and kurtosis of emerging markets 
ERP, contrasted to developed markets. 
16 
Figure 3: Distributional characteristics for monthly equity risk premia developed and emerging 
markets in US$ for Jan 1976 - December 2001. Both graphs show the five year trailing skewness and 
kurtosis of monthly US$ ERP for developed and emerging markets. The thick lines display the series for 
emerging markets; dotted lines are for developed markets. 





































































We show that favourable return characteristics of emerging markets differ by 
sample period, but find it hard to identify the effect of market integration and economic 
reform. We cannot find statistical evidence supporting the hypothesis that structural 
changes are causing changes in the level of ERP. However, we tend to feel that the 
emerging market crises that occurred during the 1990s might have a disproportionate 
effect on the results. More empirical study on the cause and nature of the observed time-
                                                 
16 We see some temporary shocks in skewness and kurtosis, but the most sizeable shock is the 
stock market crash of October 1987. The shocks to skew and kurtosis five years later are because 
of this observation falling out of the sample.    20
variation is clearly needed. The graphs presented indicate that skewness and kurtosis are 
showing some convergence with developed market in the latter part of the 1990s.  
As the cross-sectional variation of ERP in emerging markets is large, the effects 
of a successful reform in a specific market may be dwarfed on aggregate. Following 
Henry [2000] we can be specific in the dates for the first stock market liberalisation 
(Table 8) to test whether there is a significant chance in the level before and following the 
date. Are investors rewarded in the transition process? In order to test for a structural 
difference in level of ERP we make some adjustment to ensure that we have a similar 
number of data point per country from the period proceeding and post liberalisations. For 
lack of sufficient data from proceeding the liberalisation date we omitted Malaysia, 
Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand from our study.  
Table 8: First stock market liberalisation. This table is reprint of Table 1 (pp 534) of Henry [2000].  
Country  Date of first stock market liberalisation 
Argentina  November 1989 
Brazil  March 1988 
Chile  May 1987 
Colombia  December 1991 
Mexico  May 1989 
Venezuela  January 1990 
India  June 1986 
Korea  June 1987 
Malaysia  May 1987 
Philippines  May 1986 
Taiwan  May 1986 
Thailand  January 1988 
 
As with the aggregate data we cannot find unambiguous support supporting or 
rejecting the claim that liberalisation results in a change in ERP. In Korea we find a lower 
ERP in the subsequent period, but in Brazil the result is opposite and counterintuitive. In 
none of the markets were investors rewarded with an ERP over and above the return 
received for developed markets.   21
 
Cyclical aspect on emerging market ERP 
To test the hypothesis that time-variation in ERP is correlated with the global economic 
cycle, we examine the relation between changes in G7 industrial production and the ERP 
in emerging market. Figure 4 show that the correlation is evident, rising significantly 
above 0.5 in sub periods. 
17  
Figure 4: The business cycle and emerging market ERP. The dashed line shows the yearly changes in G7 
industrial production (OECD). The solid line gives the ERP in emerging markets after applying a twelve-









































The only period for which the correlation breaks down is in the early 1990s. 
Despite the global downturn, investors in emerging markets were rewarded. Better still, 
investors received an ERP over and above that of developed markets.  Although we 
                                                 
17 We do not display statistics, but note that the fit is better than the similar relation for G7 ERP 
and G7 industrial production.  Secondly, there are noticeable differences in lag structure between 
period before 1990s and during the 1990s. Thirdly, using OECD leading indicators instead of 
actual production leads to an even better fit and similar conclusions.    22
couldn’t find statistical evidence (in previous section) on structural changes determining 
changes in level of ERP, it is promising to note the disparity during this period quoted for 
structural changes. Something clearly happened.  
In the cross-section of emerging markets, we find additional support for the 
correlation of the global economic cycle and ERP. For lack of sufficient data we omitted 
the Eastern European countries and studied only the major Latin American and Asian 
markets.  Argentina, Mexico, Chile and Brazil show sizable correlation, which makes 
sense. Frankel and Roubini [2002] note that the recession among industrialized countries 
in 1980-1982 depressed p rices and volumes for exports from emerging markets and 
contributed to the Latin American debt crisis. For Korea and India the correlation with 
the global cycle is also high but slightly less prominent, which is somewhat 
counterintuitive for economies that are export oriented. An explanation for the weaker 
link probably lies in the cause of the Asian crisis, which is thought to be more domestic. 
Whereas Asia was in a deep recession, the rest of the world managed to escape recession. 
The major central banks of the world successfully avoided contagion by lowering interest 
rates.  
Obviously, it is not so easy to draw hard conclusions from these exercises. We 
have omitted other factors that might be of major importance to ERP in emerging 
markets, e.g. global interest rates and capital flows as suggested by Calvo, Leiderman and 
Reinhart [1993]. But at a minimum, our results seem to indicate that, on aggregate, the 
time variation in ERP is largely determined by changes in the economic business cycle. 
They have some form of explanatory power over their risk premium. Investors in 
emerging markets tend to be rewarded with high ERP during global economic 
expansions. Moreover, the rewards during such periods are substantially above the 
rewards received in developed markets. This hints that investors treat emerging markets 
as “high beta” markets.  
   23
4. SUMMARY  
In this paper we test whether emerging markets carry a higher equity risk premium than 
developed markets. Using standard statistical techniques, we find statistically significant 
differences that investors should be able to exploit. However, downside risk reveals that 
this reward in emerging markets comes with severe risk in certain time periods. Results 
should be interpreted with caution, as both risk and return are dependent on the sample 
period taken. Finding conclusive results in studies with emerging markets is difficult. We 
observe cyclical time varying behaviour in the emerging market ERP data, but cannot 
claim the presence of a structural break in the data. The extent to which investors are 
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